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Over the years, the principles of metaphorical interpretation have been 
proposed to be semantic, pragmatic, or/and cognitive. However, these pro-
posed theories have never reached even a near consensus. In this context, 
recently, Leezenberg (2001) proposed an interesting theory based on the no-
tions of "context" and "thematic dimension," which is basically semantic 
but also tries to combine cognitive aspects of language. Given this, one pur-
pose of this paper is to review Leezenberg's theory. In the process of 
pointing out some problems of his theory, we will propose an alternative 
analysis on the principles of metaphorical interpretation which combines 
semantic and cognitive aspects of language. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of metaphor has more than 2,300 years of history if we 
regard Aristotle's statements on metaphor as the beginning of studies in 
this area. Including Aristotle, the traditionalists' view on metaphor was 
such that it is a figure of speech used for special effects, and that you 
must have a special talent to be able to use it and use it well. However, 
metaphor is found in our everyday language as well as in literary work, 
as Lakoff et al. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Turner, 
1989; Lakoff, 1990; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff, 1999) have also observed. 
The cognitive semanticists represented by Lakoff put forth a new view 
of metaphor. This theory, which treats metaphor as a primary research 
thesis, proposed that metaphor is a property of concepts, not of words, 
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and it is central to our everyday language. It was further proposed that 
the language users categorize the world and break it into concepts mainly 
through metaphors. Although this theory has had a big influence on met-
aphor research and produced numerous followers, it is being as severely 
criticized by the truth-conditional semanticists as the cognitivists criticize 
the truth-conditional semantics. On the one hand, the main criticism by 
the cognitivists is that truth or understanding cannot be framed in an 
absolute and neutral conceptual system, but it should be relative to our 
cultural conceptual systems. They argue that there is no such thing as the 
objective reality, which is a myth. On the other hand, the main criticism 
by the truth-conditionalists is that the cognitivists do not provide a way 
to go from our internal representations to the outside world. Furthermore, 
the cognitive theory of metaphor as cross-conceptual domain mappings is 
not vigorous enough. 
Given this never-compromising situation, in which a theoretical con-
sensus seems to be far away, what could reasonably be concluded is that 
a theory that combines the concept of objective reality by the truth-
conditional view and the concept of mental representations by the cog-
nitive view is called for. In this respect, Leezenberg's (2001) semantic 
theory comes up as a promising approach, which tries to combine cogni-
tive aspects of language, based on the notions of "context" and "thematic 
dimensions." 
In this context, one of the two purposes of this paper is to review 
Leezenberg's theory and discuss its problems. The other purpose is to 
propose an alternative analysis as an attempt to complement the problems 
of Leezenberg's theory, which will also combine semantic and cognitive 
aspects of language. 
This paper will be organized as follows: In section 2 Leezenberg's theory 
will be reviewed, and in section 3 some problems of his theory will be 
discussed. In section 4 an a,lternative theory will be presented. 
2. Leezenberg's Metaphor Theory 
2.1. Thematic Dimension 
Leezenberg (2001) argues that the metaphorical interpretation is the pro-
positional content semantically determined in context. According to him, 
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there is no difference such as non-literal vs. literal meaning between a 
metaphorical interpretation (hereafter, MO and a literal interpretation 
(hereafter, LI). Both of them are semantically determined meanings, and 
the context determines which interpretation is obtained. He argues that 
"there simply are no properties or criteria that strictly distinguish meta-
phorical and literal language. Metaphor is not a syntactic construction or 
a semantic object of a specific nature; it is a mode of interpretation" 
(Leezenberg, 2001, p. 186). 
Then, given a sentence for which both a so-called LI and a so-called MI 
are available, what contextual factors determine which of the two inter-
pretations is selected? Take a look at the following example from Leezenberg 
(2001, p. 8): 
(1) Anchorage is a cold city. 
In (1), according to Leezenberg, if cold is interpreted as a "climate or 
temperature" property, it receives the LI, while if it is interpreted as a 
"hospitality or attractiveness" property, it receives the MI. He proposes 
that this property, namely, "thematic dimension," determines which of the 
two interpretations is selected. 
The notion of "thematic dimension" is originated from Bartsch (1987). 
She observes that "dimensionally weakly determined" property expres-
sions like good, satisfactory, and strong do not in themselves express any 
specific property, but require a specification of which respect of quali-
fication they apply in. That is, thematic dimension specifies the theme of 
a discourse, or what that discourse is about, as the following example 
shows: 
(2) John's paper is stylistically good. 
In (2), the adverb plays a role of explicitly indicating the thematic di-
mension of the utterance. What (2) asserts is that John's paper is good in 
terms of its style, but it does not assert anything about, say, the academic 
quality of its contents. 
As in utterances like (2), thematic dimensions can be expressed ex-
plicitly. However, they need not be fully specified as in the following: 
(3) John is doing well. 
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Depending on the context, (3) could mean that John is doing well in all 
relevant respects. Or it could be interpreted with respect to a specific 
thematic dimension such as health, career, finance, family, etc. 
Leezenberg suggests that thematic dimensions involve presupposed 
rather than asserted information. Consider the following two pairs of 
examples: 
(4) a. John is doing well financially. 
b. John is not doing well financially. 
(5) a. John is talking fast. 
b. John is not talking fast. 
First, the predicate-limiting adverbial in (4) is not affected by negation 
while the manner adverbial in (5) is affected by negation. Consequently, 
the following inferential patterns can be observed:1) 
(6) a. John is doing well financially P" John is doing well 
b. John is talking fast 1= John is talking 
In other words, predicate-limiting adverbials express presupposed content, 
but manner adverbials express part of the asserted content. 
It is assumed that there are three kinds of thematic dimensions: in-
ternal, external, and contextual dimensions. For example, dimensionally 
strongly determined expressions like mauve are said to carry an internal 
thematic dimension; for mauve, an internal dimension of color. Some 
weakly determined adjectives like good can also have a default internal 
dimension. Say, when predicated of people, it carries the default internal 
dimension of moral qualities. Explicit lexical items like predicate-limiting 
adverbials indicate external dimensions, and contextual dimensions are 
dimensions determined contextually. General considerations of discourse 
coherence explain the order of priority of external, contextual, and in-
ternal dimensions. Take a look at the following examples:2) 
1) Here, symbols F and po represent semantic entailment relations. Obviously, "p F q" means 
"p entails q" while "p po q" means "p does not entail q." 
2) (7a, b, c) are my own examples. 
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(7) a. (Out of the blue) John is good. 
b. (Mary is looking for a good-looking and good-mannered escort 
for a party, where she wants to show off herself. Someone is 
recommending John as her escort.) 
John is good. 
c. When it comes to athleticism, John is good. 
(7a), which involves a default internal dimension, is interpreted to mean 
that John is a good person morally. (7b), with a contextual dimension, 
means that John is a good escort candidate with good looks and manners. 
(7c), in which an external dimension is lexically indicated, asserts John's 
good athleticism, but it doesn't assert his goodness as a player with 
stamina, as a player with sense, or as a player in general. 
When it comes to the issue of the correlation between metaphor and 
thematic dimensions, Leezenberg proposes that LI presupposes the default 
thematic dimension while MI presupposes a novel thematic dimension. In 
other words, back to (1), 
(1) Anchorage is a cold city 
the LI of (1) is obtained in the default thematic dimension, "climate or 
temperature" dimension, while its MI is obtained in a novel dimension, 
"hospitality or attractiveness" dimension, depending on the context. 
2.2. Semantic Clash 
Leezenberg also argues that Generativists' account based on the notion 
of semantic clash or grammatical deviance is not correct. According to 
Chomsky (1965, p. 149), so-called semigrammatical sentences that violate 
selectional restrictions could receive a metaphorical or other nonliteral 
interpretation in an appropriate context. That is, Generativists argued that 
an MI can be obtained if a semantic clash or deviance is observed in the 
LI of an utterance, as illustrated in the following examples: 
(8) a. Sincerity may frighten the boy. (Chomsky 1965) 
b. John is a tiger. 
Concerning the notion of semantic clash in the interpretation of metaphor, 
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Leezenberg argues that many metaphors are not at all grammatically 
deviant. He presents the following utterances as counterexamples, to sup-
port his argument: 
(1) Anchorage is a cold city. 
(9) The rock is becoming brittle with age. 
He argues that no semantic clash is observed in the LI of either (1) or (9). 
Consequently, a semantic clash cannot be a necessary condition to derive 
the MI of an utterance. As for the MI of each of the above utterances, if 
a novel dimension, namely, "hospitality" dimension is applied in the 
context, (1) receives an MI. For (9), its LI involves the default internal 
dimension, namely, "biological" dimension. However, if a novel dimension 
is applied in an appropriate context, the rock could refer to an emeritus 
professor, and an MI is derived. 
He further proposes that the sense of anomaly felt by the language 
users in the MI is related with the novelty of the thematic dimension 
involved in it: 
(10) John is a wolf. 
The default dimension of (10) is a "biological" dimension, in which what 
(10) means is that John is biologically a wolf. You could say in this 
reading that John is the name of a wolf. On the other hand, the MI of 
(10) involves a novel dimension, say, a non-biological "personality" dimen-
sion)) In this reading, John could be described as a person who is cruelly 
avaricious, a person who amorously hangs around women, and so forth. 
Thus, the sense of semantic deviance intuitively felt by the language 
users comes from the newness or unfamiliarity of the thematic dimension 
of the MI of an utterance. 
Consider the following example: 
(11) Halfway down the path of life. (Dante) 
3) In fact, Leezenberg does not specify which novel dimension is involved in the MI of 
either (9) or (10). Obviously, depending on the context, more than one dimension could 
work as candidates for novel dimensions for (9) and (10) each. 
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According to Leezenberg, outside a thematic context, metaphors typically do 
not yet express any specific content. Therefore, what is indicated by (11) is 
merely that the path cannot be interpreted in its default thematic 
dimension. That is, this dimension is blocked if it is not compatible with 
features of the reference situation, specifically those introduced by the 
modifier of life. Thus, he further comments that the "blocking of default 
dimensions accounts for the sense of anomaly that metaphors, especially 
those involving dimensionally strongly determined expressions, tend to 
display when taken out of context" (Leezenberg, 2001, p. 225). 
To summarize some important aspects of Leezenberg's theory, first, the 
semantic interpretation process of metaphor is context-dependent. Second, 
(predicative) metaphors express class assertions, and do not indirectly 
convey a metaphorical content. For example, a metaphor John is a wolf 
expresses the assertion that John belongs to the extension of the predicate 
wolf within a specific thematic dimension of the context. Third, there is 
nothing "metaphorical" about the content of an utterance itself. It is just 
the propositional content determined by the metaphorical application of 
an expression in a novel thematic dimension. What is asserted is the 
content of the sentence as interpreted metaphorically, and what is presup-
posed is the thematic dimension that is implicitly given or linguistically 
expressed. 
2.3. Ad Hoc Concepts and Theories 
In this subsection, we should discuss two lUore important notions of 
Leezenberg's theory, namely, "ad hoc concepts" and "theories." After pro-
posing a principle of MI based on the notions of context and thematic 
dimension, he states that a semantic account cannot explain why a spe-
cific metaphorically applied expression determines a specific property, es-
pecially for novel and cross-categorial metaphors. He further states that 
the "motivation" of the metaphorical application of a particular predicate, 
which is an important aspect of MI, cannot be treated within semantics. 
Given this, Leezenberg seeks a solution for this at the level of concepts. 
And yet, it is argued that his complementary theory is different from 
conceptualists' views in the sense that his theory is based on more 
practice-oriented view of concepts and categorization, rather than on 
systematic and scientific view. 
For his quite epistemological approach, first, he defines some terminologies. 
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Several important notions are defined as follows (Leezenberg, 200l, p 252): 
(12) a. A concept is a meaning. A concept is an epistemological recon-
struction of properties. A concept is that in virtue of which a 
word is applied to an object or category. A concept applies, rather 
than refers, to an object or a set of objects. 
b. A category is a set of objects at the level of extensions. 
c. A word expresses a concept, and it denotes a category. 
He states that in a novel metaphor, in which the intersection of the 
so-called pre-property expressed by the metaphor and the thematic dimen-
sion is empty, the language user must "construct" a concept that cor-
responds to the attributed property.4J In other words, in the case of a 
novel metaphor, the conceptualization for the property of the metaphor in 
the thematic dimension has not been made, so that a process of concept 
construction by the language user must be rendered. This process of a 
new concept formation for a novel metaphorical expression is proposed to 
be a so-called "ad hoc concept" formation process. He further proposes the 
notion of "theories," based on which the "ad hoc concept" construction is 
made. 
First, Leezenberg's notion of "theories" is based on Murphy and Medin 
(1985). According to them, a "theory" is a collection of "mental expla-
nations" rather than a fully coherent and systematic body of knowledge, 
i.e., a "complex set of relations between concepts, usually with a causal 
basis." For example, in the case of whales, one might want to categorize 
them as fish on the basis of perceptual similarities (both have fins, live in 
water, etc.), but on the basis of causal, theoretical knowledge (mammals 
do not have gills, do not lay eggs, etc.), one might want to classify them 
as mammals. In this situation, which features are. counted as critical for 
category membership is determined by "theories," i.e., in a simplistic way, 
the language users' practice-based experiential and cognitive knowledge. 
Murphy and Medin also include those theories that are not as fully expli-
cated and general as (quasi-) scientific ones, such as commonsense beliefs 
and stereotypes, tacit background assumptions, and mental structures of 
4) Since the property of the metaphor is determined or selected in the context by the 
thematic dimension, the property of the metaphor before the contextual information is 
processed is called its "pre-property." 
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expectations about the world. Leezenberg also emphasizes "goal-based 
theories," in the sense that theories are always formed for specific "goals," 
and thus may explain and justify specific categorizations. For instance, 
barber poles and zebras are striped, but people tend to categorize zebras 
together with (non-striped) horses rather than with barber poles, based on 
a motivation, say, things that are edible, or may be useful for agricultural 
work. In most cases, there won't be any motivation for categorizing bar-
ber poles and zebras together. Consequently, categorization is determined 
by people's specific goals and interests, not just by attribute matching. 
Theories and their goals determine which features count as crucial in 
categorization. 
Second, when it comes to the notion of "ad hoc concepts" formation, 
Barsalou (1983) experimentally demonstrated that there are cases in which 
people form groupings of objects that are usually not thought of as 
belonging together, and that may clash with existing categorizations or 
violate correlational structure. And yet, if there is a need, such a concept 
may be formed in specific circumstances. Barsalou called this kind of 
theory-based and goal-determined concept as "ad hoc categories." As dis-
cussed by Barsalou (1983) and Murphy and Medin (1985), for example, 
children, dogs, stereo sets, and blankets do not form a natural concept, but 
they are taken to form an ad hoc concept "things to take out of one's 
home in case of fire," and this grouping makes sense and becomes 
coherent. 
Have a look at the following metaphor example (13): 
(13) Some lawyers are sharks. 
(14) a. I wonder why Joan took that impossible case to defend. 
b. J.'s defenders have helped him with his lawsuit, but they left 
him bankrupt. 
According to Leezenberg, a simple metaphor in (13) can lead to the for-
mation of different ad hoc concepts in different contexts, for example, 
depending on whether (13) is preceded by (14a) or (14b). The ad hoc con-
cept shark in (13) formed by the context (l4a) is something like "indi-
viduals that grab hold of anything they can," while that by (14b) is 
"individuals that ravage their victims." Thus, the notion of "perspective" 
under which the ad hoc concept is formed is important in his conceptual 
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account. This notion serves as a goal for, and a constraint on, the inter-
pretation. 
He further notes that in everyday situations, words can be applied to 
various different objects under various different perspectives, and this 
flexibility in the use of words has to be reflected systematically in the 
flexibility of concepts. The dependence on contextual factors also plays 
down the importance of abstract and decontextualized "conceptual do-
mains," which play a central role in earlier conceptualist approaches. 
To summarize, Leezenberg argues that his semantic account and con-
ceptual account are complementary and they describe the same inter-
pretive process in semantic and epistemological terms, respectively. And 
yet, the conceptual account goes beyond the semantic account, in the 
sense that it tries to explain the basis of metaphorical categorizations. 
Focusing on the main aspects of Leezenberg's theory presented in this 
section, we will try to point out some problems of his theory in the 
following section. 
3. Problems of Leezenberg's Theory 
3.1. Is "Thematic Dimension" Useful? 
As discussed above, Leezenberg argues that both LI and MI are obtained 
in the same way, except for the selection of the thematic dimension in 
the context. According to him, the former is obtained in the default 
dimension, but the latter is in a novel dimension. The following utter-
ances are two of the very few metaphor examples he uses to illustrate his 
arguments: 
(1) Anchorage is a cold city. 
(10) John is a wolf. 
In (1), as discussed above, "temperature" dimension is the default dimen-
sion, and "hospitality" dimension is a novel dimension. As for (10), "bio-
logical" dimension is the default dimension, but he is not specific about 
its novel dimension. Then, compare these examples with the following 
examples: 
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(15) Mary is cold. 
(16) I am cold. 
(17) It is a wolf. 
For (15-16), what is the default internal dimension? Is it still "temperature" 
dimension? Is "hospitality" dimension also a novel dimension here? If 
(15-16) are uttered out of the blue, the prominent reading of (15) seems to 
be such that Mary is a cold-natured person, in "hospitality" dimension, 
while that of (16) is such that the speaker feels cold, in "temperature" 
dimension. Again, the question is which is the default and which is a 
novel dimension here? As for (17), the default dimension would be 
"biological" dimension, and the utterance means that it biologically 
belongs to the wolf family. Furthermore, (17) normally cannot receive an 
MI in a novel dimension. 
Then, what is the criterion that distinguishes the default and a novel 
dimension? For cold, it seems difficult to pick the default dimension 
between "temperature" and "hospitality" dimension. Furthermore, different 
intuitions concerning the so-called MI of (1) and (15-16) seem to be due to 
the fact that in (1), cold is applied to a nonhuman while in (15-16), it is 
applied to a human. In other words, the "hospitality" property of cold is a 
human property while its "temperature" property doesn't make such a 
distinction. Also, for (10) and (17), in (10), where wolf predicates a human 
John,S) an LI is impossible, and an MI is obtained in a so-called novel 
dimension, but in (17), in which it predicates an animal, an LI is obtained 
in the "biological" default dimension. 
All in all, it seems that for cold, it is difficult to decide on the default 
dimension between "temperature" and "hospitality" dimension when it 
predicates a human entity, while only "temperature" dimension works as 
the default dimension when it predicates a nonhuman entity. These 
differences related with the property of human or nonhuman also apply 
to wolf. 
5) Here, it is also possible that John is the name of a wolf, not of a human. And yet, here we 
are just assuming that John is a human. To clarify this ambiguity, we could replace John 
with the expression the man. Similarly, in (17), we are also assuming that it is an animal, 
although it could denote an inanimate entity. 
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In this situation, it could persuasively be argued that for cold, both 
"temperature" and "hospitality" property have been conventionalized and 
lexicalized, with the selectional restriction for the latter property being 
that it applies only to human entities. Then, the distinction between the 
default and a novel dimension all seems to come down to the notion of 
semantic clash in examples like (1), (lO), and (15-17), and the notion of 
thematic dimensions becomes useless. 
Furthermore, default and novel thematic dimensions are very nebulous 
notions. A novel dimension can, after all, be argued to be a dimension 
which is not generally utilized in connection with an expression, which 
means that some kind of semantic or conceptual inconsistency is involved 
related with the dimension. If an expression is interpreted in a thematic 
dimension without any kind of semantic or conceptual inconsistency, 
what could be so novel about that dimension? Then, the notion of 
thematic dimension could be and should be replaced with the notion of 
semantic inconsistency. 
3.2. Is "Semantic Clash" Useless? 
Consider again the example presented. by Leezenberg as a counterex-
ample to the Generativists' account: 
(9) The rock is becoming brittle with age. 
As discussed above, the LI of examples like (9) does not reveal any 
semantic clash. Hence, the Generativists' claim that an MI is obtained due 
to the semantic clash observed in the LI, does not hold. However, when it 
comes to the MI of (9), in which the concept of rock applies to an 
emeritus professor in the context, a semantic inconsistency is involved. 
That is, the concept of rock, which applies to an inanimate entity in our 
semantic interpretation model, is being mapped to the concept of emeritus 
professor, which applies to an animate human. We could intuitively 
recognize a clash in our semantic model, and we need a help from our 
cognitive model, based on which the concept of rock could be mapped to 
a set which contains the emeritus professor as a sole entity in the given 
context. In other words, although an MI is not derived from the semantic 
clash in the LI of an utterance, semantic inconsistency is observed in its 
metaphorical interpretation process. 
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Consider another metaphor example: 
(18) Napoleon is getting impatient. 
In (18), the LI does not involve any semantic clash or inconsistency. And 
yet, the MI, in which Napoleon applies to a tyrannical person, does 
involve a semantic inconsistency, in th€ sense that the referred person is 
not Napoleon himself, who used to be the emperor of France. 
What seems to be happening here is that, despite the existence of 
semantic clash, the language users' effort to get meaningful information 
from an utterance makes it possible to utilize their linguistic device, i.e., 
MT, with a help from their cognitive conceptualization resources. 
3.3. Literal vs. Metaphorical Interpretation 
As discussed above, Leezenberg does not distinguish metaphorical language 
from literal language. He argues that the concept of literal meaning is a 
regulatory ideal for education and lexicography, and that it is something 
that does not really exist. 
Let us consider the following examples: 
(19) She is a princess. 
(20) John is a sheep, but Peter is a tiger. 
(21) He put a knife into my heart. I'm deeply wounded. 
(22) He threw a stone to me. 
(ll) Halfway down the path of life. (Dante) 
(23) He threw away my love. 
(24) The big wave completely broke away my life. 
(25) Love doesn't wait for you. 
First, for (19-22), depending on the context, they could either receive an LI 
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or MI, but for (11) and (23-25), they could receive only an MI. As discussed 
above, Leezenberg would set up a novel thematic dimension for each MI 
of the above examples. However, it seems to be a difference in the 
interpretation process, not in the selection of the thematic dimension, that 
distinguishes an MI from an LI. 
That is, although contextual factors play an important role in deter-
mining the meaning of an utterance including its literal and metaphorical 
meaning, the linguistic form of an utterance says a lot more about its 
meaning. In (19), that the concept of princess is predicated of she does not 
cause any semantic clash, if it is not presupposed that she is not a 
daughter or a granddaughter of a king or queen. Also in (20), no semantic 
clash is caused, if John and Peter are biologically animals. For (21), if the 
concept of heart applies to an anatomical organ of blood circulation, then 
no semantic clash is derived. Also for (22), if the concept of throwing a 
stone applies to that of physically casting a piece of mineral rock, then 
there exists no semantic deviance. In each of all these cases, an LI is 
obtained. On the other hand, the concepts of pTincess, sheep, tiger, putting a 
knife into a heart (mind), wounded, and throwing a stone could all 
receive an MI, in which a semantic clash is recognized.6) 
When it comes to examples (11) and (23-25), the linguistic context is not 
the same. Here, each pair of concepts apparently cause a semantic clash. 
In (11), a concrete physical concept path and an abstract concept life; in 
(23), a physical action throwing away and an abstract emotion love; in 
(24), a physical activity wave's breaking away and an abstract concept 
life; and in (25), an abstract and formless emotion love and a physical 
action waiting. 
Consequently, the way the examples receive an MI seems to be not so 
much related with the notions of context and thematic dimension, as with 
the notions of semantic clash and conceptualization. Besides, although it is 
true that whether an utterance receives an MI or an LI is determined in 
the context, it seems also true that the language users intuitively do 
distinguish an MI from an LI, as supported by the contrast in the avail-
ability of MI and LI between examples (19-22) and examples (11, 23-25). 
6) According to the Cobuild Metaphor Dictionary (Deignan 1995), the MI of sheep refers to a 
group of people who do not have their own opinions but just copy what other people say 
or do and believe what other people tell them to believe. As for the MI of tiger, it refers to 
a set of those people who are brave, aggressive, and determined to make the best of any 
situation. 
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Furthermore, it does not seem true that the LI, MI, speech act inter-
pretation, and ironical interpretation of an utterance all have the same 
status except for the fact that each of them is interpreted in a different 
thematic dimension. Let us consider the following example: 
(26) It's getting hot in here. 
Depending on the context, (26) could receive at least five different readings. 
These are an LI, an MI, a speech act interpretation, an ironical inter-
pretation, and a metaphorical ironical interpretation. The first LI is such 
that the temperature of the place is rising. The second MI is such that, 
say, the speaker is talking about the intensity of an argument going on at 
the place. The third speech act reading could be such that the speaker is 
requesting the hearer to open the window by uttering (26). The fourth 
ironic reading is such that the speaker is sarcastically describing the 
situation in which s/he feels cold, although, say, s/he was informed that 
the heating system began to work quite a while ago, so that the tem-
perature of the place would rise by now. The fifth ironic and meta-
phorical reading is such that the speaker is again sarcastically describing 
the tepidness of an argument going on at the place, say, contrary to his or 
her expectation that it would be intense. 
Given these readings, Leezenberg should argue that all these readings 
have the same status, and that the interpretation of (26) is determined in 
the context, depending on which thematic dimension is selected. Then, 
what is the default and what is a novel dimension here? 
3.4. Conventionalized vs. Novel Metaphor 
Leezenberg observes that conventional metaphor and novel metaphor 
cannot be divided into two distinct groups, and that these notions are 
related to the scale of conventionality. 
Metaphors are continuously created. If a new metaphor is applied not 
just once, but repeatedly applied in one instance after another, it will 
gradually be conventionalized, and it could reach the level of lexicali-
zation at the end. In this sense, the conventionality of a metaphor is a 
scalar notion. 
When discussing his theory based on the notion of thematic dimension, 
Leezenberg does not distinguish conventional metaphors from novel meta-
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phors. Only when he discusses the notion of "ad hoc concept formation," 
he proposes that for novel metaphors, the conceptualization for the pro-
perty of the metaphors in the thematic dimension has not been made, so 
that a process of concept construction by the language user must be 
made, which is an "ad hoc concept formation" process. 
What could be inferred from this is that Leezenberg accounts for con-
ventionalized or dead metaphors with thematic dimensions, while dealing 
with novel metaphors with ad hoc concept formation. This two-way 
account obviously has problems. One is that as he observes himself, the 
conventionality of metaphors is a scalar notion, so that you cannot divide 
metaphors into one group of conventionalized metaphors and the other 
group of novel metaphors, and provide two different interpretation 
principles for two groups of metaphors. A persuasive theory of metaphor 
should be able to account for the scalar property of the conventionality of 
metaphors. 
Another problem is that he tries to explain conventionalized metaphors 
with the notion of novel as well as default thematic dimension. If we look 
at Lakoff's metaphorical examples based on conceptual metaphors, in-
cluding Leezenberg's few examples of metaphor, most of them are ob-
served to be conventionalized and lexicalized metaphors.?) The following 
are some of the examples and their lexicalized metaphorical meanings 
listed in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd 
Edition: 
(27) a. cold: not affectionate, cordial, or friendly; unresponsive 
b. wolf: a cruelly rapacious person; 
a man who makes amorous advances to many women 
c. shark: a person who preys greedily on others, as by cheating or 
usury; a person who has unusual ability in a particular 
field 
d. sun: something likened to the sun in brightness, splendor, etc. 
e. healthy: prosperous or sound 
f. burn: to feel extreme anger; to feel strong emotion or passion 
g. prune: to remove (anything considered superfluous or undesirable) 
7) The concept shark, which is used as an example of novel metaphor by Leezenberg, as 
discussed in section 2.3. above, is also included in the list of lexicalized examples (27). 
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That the metaphorical meanings of these expressions are lexicalized 
indicates that the distinction between the default and novel dimension is 
quite arbitrary. For example, the "hospitality" property of cold in (27a) is 
so well-trenched that the first reading you get from (28a) is such that she 
is unfriendly and unhospitable. This reading could intuitively be per-
ceived as an LI. Even if it is perceived as an MI, the "hospitality" thematic 
dimension is unlikely to be perceived as being novel or unfamiliar. As 
discussed above, however, the primary reading of (28b) is obtained in the 
"temperature" dimension. 
(28) a. She is cold. 
b. Anchorage is a cold city. 
Then, where does the notion of novel dimension come from? How is the 
novelty of a dimension determined? The answers for these questions are 
not clear at all, and Leezenberg's account on conventionalized metaphors 
in terms of the thematic dimension should be questioned. 
To summarize this section, some problems of Leezenberg's analysis have 
been discussed. The notion of thematic dimension, on which his theory is 
crucially based, has been argued to be inappropriate, and his two-way 
analysis has also been argued to be problematic. Given this, we will 
present an alternative account of metaphor in the following section, 
which hopefully could solve the problems posed by Leezenberg's theory. 
4. An Alternative Analysis 
4.1. Kinds of Metaphor 
As pointed out above, novel metaphors are continuously created. Be-
sides, some of them are repeatedly applied and become conventionalized 
enough to be part of the lexicon. Thus, depending on the degree of con-
ventionality, metaphors could be lined up on a scale. At one end of the 
scale, fully conventionalized metaphors as in (29) form a group whose 
meanings have entered the lexicon, while at the other end of the scale, 
novel metaphors as in (30) and (31) form another group whose meanings 
require an extra process of interpretation on the part of the language 
users. 
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(29) a. She is a princess. 
b. Don't be a sheep. Be a tiger. 
c. A good therapist will try to find the root of the problem (Cobuild 
English Guides 7: Metaphor) 
d. The mouth of the river 
e. The foot of the mountain 
(30) a. Love is (riding] a taxi. (A bus comes if you wait, but a taxi 
should be caught. If it rains or snows, you have to wait longer. 
When you get off, you have to pay the price. If you have come 
a long way, you have to pay more when you get off. Further-
more, a shared ride is illegal.) 
b. Life is a marathon. (Everyone is equal on the start line. You 
have the finishing line to reach. After you start, there could be 
people ahead of you and/or behind you .... ) 
(31) a. My gag is water. (It's not nutritious.) 
b. My gag is side dishes. (If it's all the same, it's cloying.) 
c. My gag is the first snow of the season. (It quickly passes by.) 
d. My gag is a listening test. (If you miss the first part, it's all 
over.) 
e. My gag is the early-riser amateur soccer. (Although nobody is 
watching, I do my best.)8) 
The metaphorical meanings of the italicized expressions in (29) are listed 
in the lexicon, but those of the expressions in (30) and (31) cannot easily 
be derived without a help from the utterer. And yet, if you are provided 
with the information in the parentheses as in (30) and (31), you could 
easily nod at the reasoning or conceptualization behind them. 
Another observation is that among the examples in (30) and (31), the 
metaphorical reading of (30b) seems to be rather easily derived, comparing 
to the other examples. It indicates that for example, the relationship 
between the concept of love and that of taxi in (30a) is "cognitively less 
accessible" than the relationship between life and marathon.9) A mapping 
8) Examples (31a-e) are from the Internet. These are the lines of a gagman who appeared on 
the KBS Gag Concert program. 
9) The notion of "cognitive accessibility." used here is quite closely related to Sweetser and 
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between two heterogeneous concepts causes a semantic clash, and as an 
effort to get a meaning from this mapping as cooperative and effective 
language users, we attempt to utilize a mechanism of metaphor by 
conceptualization. Then, this conceptualization could easily be rendered if 
two heterogeneous concepts are cognitively more accessible, like the pair 
life and marathon. These two concepts seem more accessible to each 
other than the concepts love and taxi, since through our experiences, 
world knowledge, and cognitive abilities, we could find compatible or 
correlative aspects more easily between the former pair of concepts than 
the latter. 
Let us compare examples in (30) and (31) with the following examples 
from K6vecses (2002): 
(32) Two roads diverged in a wood, and I--
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
(From a poem by R. Frost) 
(33) Does the road wind up-hill all the way? 
Yes, to the very end. 
Will the day's journey take the whole long day? 
From morn to night, my friend. 
But is there for the night a resting place? 
A roof for when the slow, dark hours begin. 
May not the darkness hide it from my face? 
You cannot miss that inn. 
(From a poem by C. G. Rossetti) 
The passages in (32-33) are generally analyzed to be interpreted meta-
phorically. The two poets are conceptualizing the concept of "life" in 
terms of that of "journey," according to K6vecses. In (32), the two roads 
Fauconnier's notion of "access." The following is their "principle of access" (1996, p. 7): 
... An expression which names or describes one entity (the trigger) can be used to 
access (and hence refer to) an entity (the target) in another domain only if the second 
domain is cognitively accessible from the first, and if there is a connection between 
trigger and target. 
This notion will be discussed more in detail below. 
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indicate the two alternatives the poet had in his life. Similarly, in (33), 
"living a life" is compared to "traveling along the winding road." 
One thing we can observe in these poems is that their metaphorical 
reading could often be unnoticed by the readers unless the critics' 
interpretations are provided. This could be explained by the fact that 
which concept is related to which concept is not revealed linguistically as 
well as contextually. In other words, the two passages are well read literally 
and without any context. 
As will be shown below, examples like (32-33) could be used as counter-
examples to Lakoff's system of conceptual mappings as a theory of meta-
phorical interpretation, since this kind of conceptualizations at an abstract 
level do not seem to be utilized when we interpret metaphors. What we 
need is a process of conceptualization at a more specific level, i.e., direct 
conceptualizations between linguistic expressions and their new concepts. 
In sum, we have roughly classified metaphors into three groups, in 
terms of the degree of conventionality. One group includes fully-convention-
alized metaphors, as examples (29b-e), which do not require an additional 
conceptualization process.lO) Another group contains unconventionalized 
but interpretable metaphors, as, probably, examples like (30b), which could 
be interpreted through a conceptualization process based on the language 
users' world knowledge, experiences, cultural stereotypes, etc. The last group 
consists of unconventionalized novel metaphors, which are not easily in-
terpreted, as examples like (30a) and (31a-e). These metaphors require not 
only an additional conceptualization process, but also extra information 
related with the conceptualization, as illustrated by the additional infor-
mation in the parentheses in (30a) and (31a-e). 
Although we have roughly classified metaphors into three groups, it is 
obvious that no clear-cut distinction between groups can be made and 
there exist fuzzy or intermediate areas between groups. Furthermore, 
depending on individual language users, groups of people, and individual 
metaphors, there could be variations in conventionality and cognitive 
accessibility with the same metaphor expression. Given this, the important 
thing is that a theory of metaphor should be able to account for this 
10) As for (29a), you might also include princess in the fully-conventionalized metaphor 
group, since its metaphorical meaning could be found in the dictionary. And yet, as 
discussed below, since it could receive different MIs depending on the context, although 
the basic meaning of all these MIs is similar to each other, we leave it out from the 
fully-conventionalized metaphor group. 
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scalar property of metaphors. Leezenberg's theory, however, comes down 
to bifurcating metaphors into two ambiguous groups, one of which is 
accounted for by his semantic approach based on thematic dimension and 
the other by his cognitive approach based on ad hoc concept formation. 
4.2. Accessibility Checking and Conceptualization 
First, let us consider the following example: 
(34) She is not a mother. 
For (34), suppose a situation in which the speaker is talking about a 
woman who left home abandoning her children to find a better life. In 
this situation, the extensional meaning of (34) is false with respect to the 
possible world model of a model-theoretic semantics, since the woman is a 
mother. Given this, as in the case of presuppositional accommodation, the 
hearer tends to try to find a way to interpret the speaker's utterance as 
relevant and true. As a result, in (34), the hearer rejects the false LI as a 
possible reading, and finds another suitable interpretation. This alternative 
interpretation is such that the woman under discussion does not reach the 
speaker's or general public's certain expectations of a mother. Here, these 
expectations include a property of a mother such that she should be a 
person who could sacrifice her life for her children and stand by them, 
especially in times of trouble. This reading cannot be an intensional 
interpretation. The speaker and hearer already know that the woman is a 
mother, so that they cannot "believe" that she is not a mother. 
Then, what is this interpretation? I'd like to propose that this is an MI. 
If we compare this example with (19), both (34) and (19) require a process 
of cognitive conceptualization)l) 
(19) She is a princess. 
In both (34) and (19), it could be said that the concepts of mother and 
princess are being newly conceptualized in the given contexts. For example, 
for (34), properties of the speaker's expectations of a mother may vary 
11) For (19), its LI is being ignored. Or it is assumed that she is not a woman having 
sovereign power. 
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depending on the context. They could include a property of a mother as a 
primary caretaker, as a strong emotional supporter, as a good role-model 
and educator, or as a traditional homemaker. As for (19), as pointed out 
above, it could be argued that its MI has been lexicalized. However, as in 
the case of (34), the source of her being called a princess could vary de-
pending on the context. It could be her graciousness, her pretentiousness, 
or something else. 
Especially for (34), its process of conceptualization seems to be a quite 
productive one, as the following examples show: 
(35) a. She is not a woman. 
b. She is not a teacher. 
c. He is not a clergyman. 
d. He is not a politician. 
In what way, slhe is deviant from the speaker's expectations of a woman, 
teacher, clergyman, or politician could be determined by the conceptu-
alization performed in each context. For (35a), the way she dresses, the 
way she behaves, the way she talks, or the way she deals with things (or 
all of these) could be different from the speaker's or the general people's 
expectations of a woman. 
In this way, an MI involves a process of conceptualization, which is 
similar to Leezenberg's ad hoc concept formation process. In other words, 
for example, in (34), we could conceptualize the concept of mother as a 
set of mothers who could sacrifice their lives for their children and stand 
by them in times of trouble, and what is asserted by (34) is that she does 
not belong to this set. 
Consider some more metaphor examples: 
(36) a. His career is roller-coastering. 
b. His career is skating. 
c. His career is roller-blading. 
In (36a, b, c), in a general picture, his career is being conceptualized as 
"going on the road riding on a vehicle," i.e., as "something that is making 
a progress toward a goal." In a specific picture, as for (36a), the suddenly 
extremely changeable characteristic of roller-coastering is salient enough 
to guarantee the conceptualization of his career as "riding on a roller-
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coaster." Or it might also be argued that this conceptualized meaning of 
roller-coastering has been well-conventionalized to be listed in the lexicon. 
On the other hand, for (36b, c), the characteristics of skating and roller-
bZading don't seem to be distinguished enough to be able to be mapped 
onto the concept of his career. 
What is proposed to happen in this situation is that given the semantic 
incompatibility of two concepts in utterances like (36a, b, c), we first 
check the accessibility between the two concepts on a cognitive level, not 
on a semantic level. Based on our world knowledge, experiences, social 
practices, and other resources, we decide on the possibility of conceptu-
alization between the two concepts. As for (36a), a cognitive accessibility 
could rather easily be captured and a conceptualization is performed. 
Concerning (36b) and (36c), however, the degree of accessibility seems to 
be too low to be perceived Thus, the hearer might leave it to the speaker's 
explanation or reject its MI. 
There exist different degrees of accessibility, depending on the appro-
priateness as well as the conventionality· of metaphorical expressions. 
Although the speaker provides a basis of the metaphorical conceptu-
alization, the hearer might reject it as an unsuccessful case. For the 
following examples, more than one accessibility could be found, and we 
should decide which is appropriate in the context: 
(37) a She is the sun. 
b. She is Cleopatra. 
As for (37a), the concept, the sun, could be accessible in more than one 
way. Among these possibilities, one should be selected in the context, and 
the sun could be conceptualized in one of these ways: (i) exemplary and 
peerless, worthy of worship; (ii) with extreme anger or brute force; (iii) 
with uninterrupted continuity of righteousness; (iv) with the cyclicity and 
eternal recurrence of greatness.12l If, say, it is conceptualized as (i), she 
should belong to a set of people who are exemplary and peerless, worthy 
of worship, for (37a) to be asserted as a true statement. Similarly, for (37b), 
Cleopatra is also accessible in more than one way, so that it could be 
conceptualized as a woman who is very seductive, who has an exuded 
12) Stern (2001) provides (37a) as a metaphorical utterance with more than one ML 
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charisma, who is a shrewd politician, or as all of these. 
As for (38a, b), neither an accessibility between the concept of blazing 
(fire) and that of intensity of indifference nor an accessibility between 
her beauty and something built-up (building) can be captured for a 
process of conceptualization to be made: 
(38) a. His indifference toward her was blazing. 
b. She's been trying to build up her beauty. 
That is, based on our various knowledge and experiences, the concept of 
a weak emotion such as indifference is not accessible from the concept of 
blazing. Similarly, the concept of beauty doesn't seem to be accessible 
from the concept of building, although it might become possible in the 
future down the road. 
To summarize, an accessibility between two concepts can be perceived 
in degrees. If it is low, no conceptualization is likely to be made. Besides, 
more than one perceivable accessibility between a pair of concepts could 
be obtained, but only one of them leads to a conceptualization in the 
given context. This process of accessibility checking and the process of 
conceptualization based on the result of this accessibility checking are 
proposed to account for the scalar property of metaphors discussed above. 
Then, the process of MI is proposed as follows. First, MI presupposes 
semantic clash. It is not that the semantic clash involved in the LI of an 
utterance licenses its MI, as argued by the Generativists, but simply that 
an MI presupposes a semantic clash. That is, it is not just another 
interpretation of an utterance with its only difference having a different 
thematic dimension from that of its LI, but it involves a semantic clash 
and additional cognitive processes of accessibility checking and concep-
tualization.13) Given a semantic deviance, what we try to do is to find a 
13) Then, what about ironic interpretation, which often also involves a semantic clash? 
Consider the following ironic utterances: 
(i) It·s getting hot in here. 
(ii) It's a wonderful weather. 
(iii) Christmas and New·Year tribulations. (Martin 1992) 
If we are reminded of the fourth ironic reading and the fifth metaphorical ironic reading 
of (i) discussed in section 3.3., it is obvious that a semantic clash is present in both of the 
readings. As for (ii), if it is uttered in a situation where the speaker is commenting on a 
horrible weather referring to the weather forecaster's opposite prediction, a semantic clash 
is also involved in this ironic utterance. And yet, (iii), which is a revised version of the 
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perceivable cognitive accessibility between two semantically incompatible 
concepts, based on which a conceptualization is made. 
These accessibility checking and conceptualization processes are pro-
posed to involve a cognitive model, Mc, which is composed of a set of 
cognitively accessible worlds, Wc, in addition to a semantic model, M, 
which includes a set of possible worlds, W.14) The cognitive model is for 
the interpretation of metaphors and possibly other expressions, which 
cannot be interpreted with respect to the possible set of worlds close to 
the actual world. This cognitive model includes A, which is a cognitive 
accessibility checking function, and C, which is a conceptualization func-
tion. It is also proposed that this cognitive model is composed of all the 
cognitive knowledge and/or state of affairs such as the social, cultural, 
emotional, and other connotations associated with each word in the 
lexicon, the categorization networks of concepts in a similar sense of 
Lakoff (1987), the concepts of boundaries and extended entities created by 
our cognition (Smith, 1999), and other various knowledge dependent on 
our cognition. 
Therefore, in our proposed theoretic framework based on model-theoretic 
semantics by Richard Montague, we need two models, one is a set of pos-
sible worlds model and the other is a set of cognitively accessible worlds 
model. If an expression manifests a semantic clash between two concepts 
in the sense discussed above, it will be interpreted with respect to the 
cognitive model, which will work as a supplementary model for the 
objective possible world model. 
typical expression "Christmas and New-Year celebrations," does not involve any semantic 
deviance. . 
Therefore, we can observe that an ironic interpretation does not always involve a 
semantic deviance, unlike an MI. It's rather that an ironic interpretation always involves a 
pragmatic deviance from the hearer's world knowledge, common sense, and experience, or 
what is generally believed or quoted. The recognition of this deviance also involves a 
metarepresentational cognitive process, but not a conceptualization process between two 
concepts as in MI. It might be argued that what an ironic utterance tries to argue or 
indicate is the deviance or clash itself between an actual state of affairs and the hearer's 
or/and the general public's world knowledge, experience, beliefs, common sense, 
previously-mentioned information, etc. For more detailed discussion on the deviance 
involved in ironic interpretation, refer to Yoon (2001). 
14) The notion of "possible worlds" is related with the objective possible states of affairs, the 
best of which is the actual state of affairs. On the other hand, the notion of "cognitively 
accessible worlds" is related with the mental states of affairs, which are composed of the 
so-called "theories." These theories work as the source of knowledge and experience for 
metaphorical conceptualizations. It is further proposed that this cognitive model works as 
a complementary model for the objective possible world modeL 
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One interesting characteristic of this model is that newly conceptualized 
concepts are continuously created in the given utterance contexts, and the 
sets of objects to which these concepts apply are also continuously created 
in the given utterance contexts. Furthermore, if one newly conceptualized 
concept repeatedly applies to a set of objects one instance after another, 
then the concept is gradually conventionalized and moves into the set of 
possible world model, M, little by little. 
To illustrate the process of MI, a fragmentary model with two metaphor 
examples is presented in the following:1S) 
(39) She is not a mother. 
(40) He threw a stone to my placid mind. 
(41) A fragmentary model: 
M=<U, W, F> 
U={a, b, c, d, e, f, g, .... , I 
I mother I = {a, c, e, g} 
[ mind I = {u, v, w, xl 
[ peaceful I = {i, j, u, wl 
[peaceful mind I = {u, wl 
[ stone I = {o, pI 
[ throw I = {<m, 0, C>, 
<n, p, g>, <b, q, y>1 
I throw a stone to someone I 
= {m, nl 
A(mother, motherd = n 
A(mother, mother2) = n 
C(mother, mother]) = {a, c, el 
C(mother, mother2) = {a, gl 
A(mind, container with fluid) = n 
C(mind, container with fluid) 
= F(mind) = {u, v, w, xl 
A(placid mind, peaceful mind) = n 
C(placid mind, peaceful mind) 
= F(peaceful mind) = {u, wl 
A(throw a stone, agitate) = n 
C(throw a stone, agitate) 
= F(agitate) = { ... I 
15) In the model (41), for simplicity, the components of a set of possible worlds (W) and that 
of cognitively accessible worlds (Wc) are being ignored. Thus, the temporary property of 
the cognitive accessibility fUIlction values and the conceptuaIization function values is not 
well represented. And yet, as discussed earlier, it is assumed that the cognitive accessi· 
bility checking and conceptualization processes are rendered given each metaphorical 
utterance in the given context. 
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In (41), the cognitive accessibility function A is represented as numbers 
between 0 and 1, where 0 means no accessibility and 1 means a full 
accessibility. If it is 0, no conceptualization can be made. And yet, there 
could be cases in which the hearer cannot decide on the degree of 
accessibility, but with a help from the speaker, a conceptualization can be 
made. The so-called "theories" in the sense of Leezenberg (2001) form the 
contextual functions, A and C. Also, "mother!" and "mother2" indicate the 
possibility of more than one instance of accessibility and conceptualization 
of mother, depending on the context.l6) 
As in (41), the two concepts, between which a cognitive accessibility is 
checked, and one of which is conceptualized in terms of the other based 
on the result of the accessibility checking, do not match with the so-called 
target and source concept domains of Lakoff's. Here, one concept, which is 
linguistically expressed as an entity or predicate, is proposed to be con-
ceptualized into another concept, which is semantically heterogeneous to 
the former concept. Thus, the mapping between two concepts here is a 
process of searching for the metaphorical concept for a linguistic expres-
sion, which could sometimes be accounted for as part of Lakoff's con-
ceptual metaphor system. 
S. Conclusion 
Then, what can we conclude from all these discussions on metaphor? 
Why do we use metaphors? The answers for these questions might be 
quite expected ones. In some cases, we need metaphors. We cannot talk 
about the workings of abstract concepts without metaphors. We need to 
16) As also pointed out by the reviewers, it should be admitted that the notion of "acces-
sibility checking" heavily relying on the notions of "context" and "cognitively accessible 
world model" could be considered quite vague. For example, the notion of "theories," 
which make up the cognitive model, is something that could be quite temporary and 
changeable, although the information that makes up the possible world model is also 
constantly updated. Besides, newly conceptualized concepts keep popping up and then 
disappear instantly. Only some of them keep showing up, being gradually conven-
tionalized, and become part of the possible world model. In this sense, metaphorical 
conceptualization is a scalar notion. That is, all metaphorical expressions and concep-
tualizations are located on the scale of conventionality. Since metaphorical conceptuali-
zation and conventionalization processes rely on the mental states of affairs instead of the 
objective states of affairs, it doesn't seem to be easy to clearly exhibit their workings and 
mechanisms. 
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concrete these concepts to make them approachable, or we simply need 
the help of metaphors to talk about them. In this way, some metaphors 
are indispensable. 
Also, we tend to generalize, categorize, and conceptualize things. We 
talk about things, states, activities, and events. We do not just describe 
them, but we examine, analyze, anatomize, evaluate, define, and make 
judgements on them. These are what we civilized humanbeings do in our 
daily lives. At the level of describing as well as at the other levels, we 
often use metaphors, or rather we are forced to utilize metaphors. We 
often don't want to describe things in the same way as before or as 
others. We tend to find new ways of describing, analyzing, evaluating, 
defining, and making judgments on things, by relating one concept to 
another concept in unique ways. In other words, metaphor is a way of 
thinking, and a natural process of human cognition. As we have seen 
above with examples (31a-e) in section 4.1., metaphors could also be used 
to derive humor by combining two semantically remote but cognitively 
accessible concepts. Furthermore, metaphors also cause meaning shift, as 
studied by linguists working on grammaticalization. 
All in all, metaphors are prevalent in our way of life, and a prevalent 
way of thinking. As pointed out by Sperber and Wilson (1986), metaphors 
approximate the speaker's thoughts rather than describing them precisely. 
The propositional form of a metaphorical utterance resembles the speaker's 
thought. laszczolt (2002) also points out that if no objective meaning could 
be derived from the relation between propositions and states of affairs, we 
have access only to mental representations. Then, truth conditions would 
have to be relativized to mental representations rather than to the world. 
And yet, as pointed out by Kamp and Reyle (1993, pp. 10-11), accounting 
for natural language solely by referring to mental representations would 
only shift the problem of meaning to another language. Furthermore, 
what we speak or think about are things in the actual world, and for 
thoughts and utterances that concern the actual world there arises the 
question whether they are true or false. Also, in the context of practical 
reasoning, the truth conditions of the factual beliefs seem to be necessary. 
Given this, it could be argued that all these facts indicate that "the 
world-directed, truth value-determining aspect of meaning" is central in 
explaining thoughts and utterances. Again, however, object reality alone 
cannot explain metaphoric utterances, which obviously should involve 
mental representations. 
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Hence, as proposed above, this important phenomenon of semantics and 
pragmatics could be accounted for by an interpretation model which 
combines a truth-conditional semantics model and a cognitive model. 
To summarize, one of the two main purposes of this paper was to 
discuss Leezenberg's (2001) interesting theory of metaphor, which is basically 
semantic but also attempts to combine cognitive aspects of language. The 
other main purpose was to propose an alternative analysis on the prin-
ciples of metaphorical interpretation, which was basically an attempt to 
complement the problems of Leezenberg's theory. 
In a situation where the two main theories of metaphor have never 
reached even a near consensus, what we can do is to point out the pro-
blems of each of the two theoretical disciplines, the cognitive semantics 
and the formal semantics, and to try to extract the virtues of the two. 
Consequently, our proposed theory, which is a combining approach of the 
two theories, seems to be part of the itinerary of our journey to reach the 
goal of coming up with a complete theory of metaphor. 
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